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Introduction 
Over the past decade, the US Government has not been significantly involved in high 
assurance Trusted Computing acquisitions and research. During this time, the 
Government’s focus on commercial 08 the shelf procurements helped to fuel explosive 
advances in commercial technology, but it also contributed to the lack of progress in the 
ability of commercial systems to appropriately protect themselves and the data with which 
they are entrusted. While industry has been driven to supply the latest technology at the 
fastest pace, it has not been motivated, either internally or externally via customer demand, 
to produce highly trustworthy computing systems. As a result, the National Information 
Infrastructure is weak; there are no high security, high assurance, off-the-shelf products 
available that can be used to strengthen it; and the National capability to design and 
construct such trusted computer systems and networks has atrophied. 
To address this downward spiral, the Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research (CISR) in 
Monterey, California, proposes a Trusted Computing Exemplar project, that will provide an 
openly distributed worked example of how high assurance trusted computing components 
can be built. Completion of this project will be performed as part of CISR’s Diamond High 
Assurance Security Program (Diamond HASP). We propose four related activities: 
1. Creation of a prototype framework for rapid high assurance system development 
2. Development of a reference-implementation trusted computing component 
3. Evaluation of the component for high assurance, and 
4. Open dissemination of deliverables related to the first three activities 
The project’s open development methodology will provide widespread availability of key 
high assurance enabling technologies and ensure transfer of knowledge and capabilities 
for trusted computing to the next generation of developers, evaluators and educators. 
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Background 
Trusted computing is special. It addresses not only the problems of frontal attacks, but also 
that of subversion: the equivalent of software "moles" in the system. Frontal attacks can 
take the form of Trojan Horse applications and other assaults from outside the system. On 
the other hand, "moles" are manifested as trap doors or other artifices placed within the 
system. They can be triggered by conditions determined by the adversary and, when active, 
can be used to launch any attack the adversary desires from within the security perimeter. 
The safeguards required to protect systems from trap doors go beyond those required to 
protect against frontal attacks. Trusted computing encompasses the science and engineering 
required to specify, design, implement, and maintain components in which we have a high 
level of confidence against both system subversion and frontal attacks. 
To protect against fiontal attacks, systems must be designed and implemented without 
exploitable flaws. The systems must be designed to constrain access to information and 
confine any damage resulting fiom the execution of malicious application software. This 
approach acknowledges that it would be infeasible and, in many cases, mathematically 
intractable to analyze and verify all the software to determine whether its behavior is 
benign. 
Instead, our engineering approach is to divide systems into two parts: 
1. An internal trusted computing component that implements the protection 
mechanismsand 
2. External s o h a r e  that is not trusted. 
The external s o h a r e  is considered potentially malicious and its execution is circumscribed 
by the trusted computing base. Using this approach, the effects of any malicious activity 
can be controlled and audited. 
Protection against trap doors also requires a. structured approach to system construction so 
that the trusted computing base of the system can be subjected to analysis that will ensure 
the absence of internal subversion. It is the proof of absence of unspecified functionality 
that distinguishes trusted computing from safety and other forms of high confidence 
computing. 
The science and discipline of trusted computing has been neglected for well over a decade. 
The government and major contractors are now uncertain about the cost and complexity of 
high assurance computer projects. We lack developers who can create trusted computing 
systems, as well as public domain worked examples upon which new projects could be 
modeled. We need to develop a new generation of tools, base hardware and s o h a r e  for 
developing trusted camputing systems, and we need concrete public domain examples of 
all the steps needed to satisfy high assurance requirements, including end-to-end formal 
proofs of policy enforcement. 
Recently, commercial organizations have begun to realize the need for trustworthy 
computing. Much of this appears to be driven by the need for Digital Rights Management, 
the protection of copyrighted information in computer systems. One current push for a 
solution comes from the Trusted Computer Platform Alliance (TCPA). The group is 
proposing a "hardware based" solution to the digital rights management problem. The 
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approach appears to be one of ensuring that only “certified” code is allowed to operate on a 
system and to access the copyrighted material. 
Although this is a good first step, it is clearly insufficient. There is no understanding of how 
one should design and architect the trusted portions of the system to provide assurance of 
its correctness, nor is there an understanding that one must limit the trusted portions to a 
small, analyzable portion of the whole system. See, for example, a recent discussion of this 
topic [Anderson02]. 
There have also been some recent government sponsored workshops and development in 
this area. These workshops have emphasized various ad hoc mechanisms for analyzing 
software for specific errors such as buffer overflow and aliasing. Although this approach is 
also a good step, it too is limited in scope. The approach seems to ignore much of the past 
work that has been done in formal modeling of the (security) properties of systems as well 
as program specification and verification. It does not address how one might ensure that a 
system does not have a trap door or meet a particular security property. 
Other agencies have recently funded work that attempts “new” approaches in this area. The 
goal of the work is to provide tools that ensure that the software is “correct by 
construction.” The approaches are primarily “software engineering” in nature. The results 
of the work are software development tools that may be useful in the verification of some 
of the properties of the system that would be useful. The tools do not address the high-level 
security architecture and design issues that are iequired for protection against moles or 
other subversion attacks. There are no examples that show the complete process that needs 
to be coherently integrated to produce a secure system, including hardware, software, 
processes, etc. 
To address the need for a high assurance secure system as well as the absence of public 
domain worked examples in this realm, CISR is proposing a trusted computing exemplar 
project. The remainder of this document describes the project and its goals. 
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Project Overview 
The purpose of the Trusted Computing Exemplar project proposed by CISR is to provide a 
worked example to show how trusted computing systems and components can be 
constructed. The project will produce of four related outputs: 
1. A high assurance development framework, 
2. A trusted computing component, 
3. Evaluation of the component, and 
4. Open distribution of project deliverables. 
A prototype high assurance developmentfiamework will be created first, and then used to 
produce a reference implementation trusted computing component, the Embedded 
MicroKernel Prototype. A third-party evaluation of the component will be initiated during 
development (e.g., once the high-level design documentation is written). The 
documentation, source code, development fiamework and other deliverables will be made 
openly available as they are produced. Co-located teams composed of a combination of 
seasoned trusted computing veterans and uninitiated “apprentices” will perform these 
activities. 
The combination of open methodology applied to all project documents and deliverables 
and the mentoring of project apprentices will provide transfer of trusted computing 
technical know-how to a new generation of trusted computing professionals. Furthermore, 
the public availability of the high assurance development framework and the reference 
trusted computing component will provide technology transfer of key enabling technologies 
to the commercial, government, and open-source communities. 
Framework for Rapid High Assurance Development 
The prototype fiamework for rapid high assurance development will provide a set of 
interoperable tools and define a set of efficient, repeatable procedures for constructing 
trusted computing systems and components. 
The toolset will support automated management of high assurance development throughout 
a product’s, lifecycle, including the following development functions: 
Specification of security properties, 
Design specification, 
Verification that security properties are self-consistent, 
Verification that a design meets its target security properties, 
Code development, 
Verification that an implementation meets its target (and contains no unspecified 
functionality), 
Configuration management of specifications, software, tools and processes, 
Specification-based testing, 
Teamwork and training support, and 
User document development. 
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The framework will support the dissemination of project deliverables using a philosophy 
similar to the “open source” approaches. This open methodology will include mechanisms 
for continuous contribution, evaluation and distribution of the various project configuration 
items and deliverables. 
Our approach for constructing the prototype development framework will be to 
interconnect, through software mechanisms and well-defined procedures, various state-of- 
the-art but stand-alone tools, each of which contributes to one or more of the required 
functions such as those described above. 
We expect that the development framework will be scaled to the size of the project. It will 
reveal those aspects of such frameworks that must be tailored to meet specific project 
requirements. Generalization of this framework to support different target technologies and 
larger projects is a topic for future research. 
Trusted Computing Reference Component - The Embedded MicroKernel Prototype 
We will develop a high assurance, embedded micro-kernel and a trusted application built 
on top of the micro-kernel as a reference implementation exemplar for trusted computing. 
Because the product as well as the process will be showpieces for trusted computing 
development, high assurance methodologies and techniques will be applied during the 
entire lifecycle (viz., design, implementation, distribution, and maintenance phases). The 
goal is to produce a very small, portable component that will take advantage of modern 
hardware support, where applicable, and that will provide users with correct security 
operation and an a priori assurance against system subversion. 
Some potential applications of the kernel afe as trusted base for a multilevel network router, 
a blackhed crypto-separation device, as a communications controller for coalition-enabled 
mobile devices and as a network authenticator for client within a multilevel network. To 
demonstrate the kernel’s utility, an application system will be developed that will act as a 
network monitor for closed multilevel networks. The system design will be extensible to 
open networks with the addition of cryptographic services. 
Kernel 
The primary security function of the Embedded MicroKernel will be to enforce process and 
data-domain separation, while providing primitive operating system services sufficient to 
support simple applications. The embedded focus of the kernel drives several high-level 
design characteristics. The kernel will be very small but complete with respect to policy 
enforcement. It will have a static runtime resource configuration and its security policy 
regarding access to resources will be based on static process/resource access bindings, that 
are subject to offline configuration (e.g., via an access matrix). We anticipate that the kernel 
will support a small number of processes, data objects, and I/O devices. There may be a 
“RAM disk” but probably no hard drive. Below, we provide a few more details about our 
view of the kernel. 
The kernel will create and support a fixed/constant number of application level processes 
established by the system configuration. Application processes will be scheduled in a 
round robin fashion with each process being given a predetermined amount of time, set by 
the configuration. 
System memory will be subdivided into units, that we call memory segments or just 
segments. Access to segments will be controlled by the kernel. The size of each memory 
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segment will be set as part of the system configuration. The process/resource access 
binding mechanism within the kernel will allow the assignment of specific modes of access, 
such as modify and observe, by which a process may access a particular resource. A variety 
of policies can be represented by this method, including one indicative of lattice of security 
domains. The static nature of the bindings means that the policy represented by the set of 
bindings will be enforced globally and persistently until the system is taken offline. A 
mandatory access control policy could then be invoked by maintaining consistency of the 
bindings across system boots. 
The kernel will provide mechanisms to handle all asynchronous interrupts. Any I/O will be 
handled by the kernel and presented to processes via memory segments that may be 
accessed via the process. 
The only way that two prgcesses may communicate (at the kernel level) will be through 
shared memory segments that at least one can write and the other can read. Different pairs 
of processes may use different segments. Simple process synchronization primitives will 
also be provided, that can be implemented to be demonstrably free of covert channels 
[Reed79][Levin90]. 
As part of kernel verification, we will prove security theorems to the effect that a pair of 
processes can communicate if and only if there is a path of processes with appropriately 
shared memory that connects the two processes. The major result will be that if there is no 
such path, then the two processes will not be able to communicate. The notion that 
there is “no such path” is part of what separates the technology that we propose from much 
of the work that is currently being done by other groups. Other groups show that there must 
be a path in certain cases, but they do not prove the absence of unacceptable paths. 
Our strategy is that by incorporating static resource allotment and various foms of 
separation early in the development process, we will both greatly simplify the design, and 
minimize the amount of post-design modifications required to address covert channels.’ 
The static nature of resource allotment will provide predictable processing behavior, as well 
as limit the covert channels based on shared resource utilization [Kemmerer82]. Since 
resources are pre-assigned, there will be no runtime allocation that would result in changes 
visible to other processes. 
Our goal in the “proof’ of the security theorems is to show how the various hardware 
mechanisms are coupled with the implementation of the kernel to achieve the separation 
and covert channel properties. 
. 
. 
’ In past security kernel projects [Sche1185, Karger90], there has been a struggle, after the system has been 
designed and initially constructed, to redesign around the “covert channel” problems: For example, covert 
channels have been closed via complex functional limitations in the software or configuration, or through 
administrative procedures [Trostle93]. 
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Network Monitor Demonstration 
It might appear that such a simple kernel would not be useful. We think that this is not the 
case for a number of different applications. Part of the reason for this is that the cost of 
modern hardware is very low. It is now possible to build large complex systems with a 
large number of simple components, in a’fashion similar to the RISC architectures for 
processors. Rather than try to build the complexity into the underlying component, we 
propose building simple components with high assurance and use these in combination to 
build high assurance systems. Our proposed demonstration system will be an example of 
this approach. 
The demonstration system is a network monitor for a multilevel LAN. The micro-kernel 
with application will be used to provide labeling of packets that are placed on the network 
and de-labeling and distribution (along with appropriate checks) of packets received from 
the network (see Figure 1). We call such a component a network monitor. Each monitor 
interfaces between a closed IP network and one or more commercial workstation devices. 
The monitor labels packets going from the devices to the LAN, and monitors traffic coming 




M - monitor 
W - workstation 
Adrnin 
User 
Figure 1. Network Monitor Demonstration System 
The monitor has a layered design, consisting of a kernel, a set of trusted processes 
operating in layer one and an application layer (viz., “layer 2”). Security policy is allocated 
to each layer in the monitor to minimize the hctionality required. The kernel-layer 
policy will be configured to completely separate the domain of labeled objects (the LAN) 
from the unlabeled domain (the workstations), while providing a means for trusted 
transition of packets between the two. Orthogonal to the kernel domains, the “layer 1” 
policy will separate different partially-ordered “workstation” domains (e.g., e.g., 
representing integrity or confidentiality policies) from each other, where the ordering 
determines allowed inter-domain accesses. Applications to manage the movement of data 
to and from the LAN will run on top of layer 1. 
In the demonstration, there are two data integrity domains, administrative and user, where 
the user domain is higher in the ordering and lower integrity than the administrative 
domain. At each monitor, there is a workstation device in each integrity domain. The user 
domain devices ?an read either user or administrative data (viz., low or high integrity data) 
from the LAN, but the administrative domain devices can read only administrative (high 
integrity) data to keep them from being corrupted by low integrity data. 
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IP packets are submitted from the workstation devices to the LAN by way of the monitor. 
The monitor labels each packet according to its source and forwards it to the LAN. When 
packets addressed to one of the devices enter the monitor from the LAN, the monitor strips 
the labels and forwards the packets to theidestination device, only if the access is allowed 
by the layer 1 policy. The layer 1 policy uses the packet label and the label of the device to 
make this determination. 
To ensure that labeled and unlabeled data do not mix, which is a precondition for the 
enforcement of the layer one policy, and to conform to the principle of least privilege2, 
separate application processes within the monitor manage different aspects of the system. 
Separate processes manage I/O for each device and for the LAN, and another policy- 
management process transitions data between the two kernel domains, while ensuring the 
enforcement of the layer 1 policy. The kernel's static access control matrix is configured so 
that packets do not transition between the.LAN (labeled domain) and the workstations 
(unlabeled domain) without going through the policy-management process. 
Future Work 
A future extension of monitor hctionality will allow communication of network status 
between monitors, and modification of policy based on that status. For example, in an 
emergency, all user-generated packets could be dropped to ensure administrative 
capabilities. Another extension would be to support connection to open (vs. closed) LANs, 
via cryptographic label authentication, In this case, the monitor would accept packets only 
if they are labeled and authenticated and would ensure that only labeled and authenticated 
packets were placed on the network. 
The Development Process 
The goal of our work is to provide very high assurance that the system will meet its security 
objectives and will not contain any mechanisms (software) that will permit subversion. To 
accomplish this we propose the following steps: 
- Develop a written description of the security policy of the system. 
- Construct a formal (mathematical) model of the security policy that reflects salient 
abstract characteristics of the system. 
- Present an argument that the model of the security policy is an accurate 
representation of the policy. 
- Develop a top level specification of the kernel using the model defined above. 
- Verify that the top level description of the kernel satisfies the security model. 
- Develop a test plan that is driven by the top level specification for both presence and 
absence of security functionality in the implementation. 
Develop an implementation of the system based on the top level description. 
Provide a code correspondence that shows that the implementation is a faithful 
representation of the top level specification. We will use as much automation in this 
step as is practical. 









Provide a covert channel analysis. 
Provide the appropriate controls on the documentation, verification processes, 
software, etc. to ensure that they cannot be subverted during the construction and 
delivery process. 
These steps constitute an iterative rather than a sequential process. As steps in the lower 
levels of the process are expanded, incompleteness, inconsistency or some other form of 
weakness in their realization may become evident. The results of steps above will then be 
revised to take into account the new information. 
Once the steps have been completed, we expect that the documentation can be read in a 
linear fashion. The goal is to present a well structured proof that the system implements its 
security policy. We intend that the documentation will help to provide the appropriate level 
of assurance. Of course, that assurance also depends on the implementation of the 
hardware, the correct configuration, etc. 
Each of these steps has some form of deliverable that is a description, a specification, a 
proof, code, etc. These paper deliverables will be part of the materials made available to 
the outside world, and will include overview materials that show how they fit into the 
development process, how each document relates to the other documents and how the 
particular document was constructed. 
The process we describe above is similar to the system development processes used to build 
any large system. The major differences are in the integration of the formalisms used to 
provide the assurances that the system meets its (security) goals. 
Reference Component Evaluation 
An independent security evaluation is required to provide confidence in the assurance 
claims made for a trusted component. Currently, no U.S. organization we are aware of is 
prepared to do an EAL7 level evaluation of a computer component or system. CISR will 
assist in developing the technology, processes and procedures that could be used in the 
evaluation of a component at that level. It is appropriate for CISR to help develop these 
processes, since they will be tied to the development and assurance processes that CISR 
will use to build the demonstration project. 
Once the evaluation processes are better understood, the reference component, the 
microkernel, will be subjected to a third-party Common Criteria evaluation at the EAL7 
[CC98] level. As there do not currently exist any generally accepted protection profiles for 
this type of high assurance system or component, a high assurance protection profile will be 
developed for use in the evaluation. The EAL7 profile will be based on the TCSEC Class 
A1 criteria [TCSECSS], and the guidelines available in the Common Criteria 
documentation. The completed kernel evaluation will provide the basis for a subsequent 
evaluation of the overall monitor system, including the layer 1 and application functions 
that implement the extended label-based security policy. 
Open Methodology 
Utilizing the open methodology tools and procedures developed in the High Assurance 
Development Framework (see above), the deliverables and outputs of the Trusted 
Computing Exemplar Project will be made available to the public, such as source code, 
project plans, and evaluation evidence and reports. 
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Part of this task will be to document for distribution the development framework, including 
its tools, methods, techniques, and social model. By making available the various high 
assurance internal engineering, evaluation and development framework documents, the 
Exemplar project will provide previously unavailable examples of how-to for high 
assurance trusted computing. 
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